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I. INTRODUCTION 
The district court erred in not dismissing Reed Taylor's ("Taylor") last remaining claim 
against Richard A. Riley ("Riley"), a claim for professional negligence seeking recovery of what 
was owed under the illegal 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. The district court's refusal to 
dismiss Taylor's professional negligence claim against Riley should be overturned based on any 
one or all of the following grounds: (1) Taylor's claim is barred by the illegality doctrine; (2) 
Taylor's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (3) Taylor released and/or waived his 
claim; (4) Taylor changed a material predicate to the Opinion Letter thereby proximately causing 
his damages; and (5) Riley owes Taylor no duty upon which to base the claim. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. THE ILLEGALITY DOCTRINE PRECLUDES TAYLOR'S CLAIM FOR 
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AGAINST RILEY. 
1. The Issue of Illegality is Properly Before the Court. 
Taylor argues that review of the effect of the illegality doctrine upon his claim against 
Riley is beyond the scope of review on a permissive appeal, is an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal, violates the Court's order granting permissive appeal and violates the Court's order 
denying Taylor's cross appeal. 
The issue of illegality of a contract can be raised sua sponte at any stage of litigation. 
Barry v. Pacific West Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). 
Permissive appeal is a stage of litigation. This Court has a duty to address the issue of illegality 
of a contract even if for the first time on appeal. Hyta v. Finley, 137 Idaho 755, 758, 53 P.3d 
1 
338, 341 (2002). Although the scope of a permissive appeal is narrow, that scope cannot trump 
the Court's obligation to address the issue of illegality at any stage of the proceeding. 1 
2. Taylor Cannot Recover Against Riley that Which He is Barred from 
Recovering Under the Illegal Stock Redemption Agreement. 
An illegal contract is unenforceable. 17 Am.Jur. 2nd Contracts § 299. There can be no 
recovery based on an illegal contract. Id Nor will the law aid a party to an illegal agreement. 
Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 400, 49 P.3d 402, 405 (2002). Courts are required to leave 
the parties to an illegal contract as it finds them, without further recourse or recovery. Farrell v. 
Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,609,200 P.3d 1153, 1158 (2009). 
Taylor seeks to avoid the effect of the illegality doctrine on his claim against Riley by 
boldly proclaiming he is not seeking to enforce the illegal Stock Redemption Agreement, but 
rather he is seeking to enforce the Opinion Letter. (Respondent's Brief, p. 39.) Contrary to this 
statement, however, Taylor also proclaims, in seeking an award of attorney fees, "that he should 
also be awarded fees for the illegal commercial transaction between he and AIA. .. " and that 
awarding him fees based on the illegal Stock Redemption Agreement would be consistent with 
ensuring that an injured party receives "the difference between the client's actual recovery and 
the recovery which should have been obtained but for the attorney's malpractice." Id. at p. 45. 
In addition, Taylor seeks as damages in this action that which he did not receive under the illegal 
Stock Redemption Agreement; i.e., the benefit of the bargain. (Respondent's Brief, p. 16.) Nor 
1 Raising the illegality doctrine in a permissive appeal is unlike Taylor raising the issues of 
assumed duty and negligent misrepresentation in this permissive appeal. There is no sua sponte 
duty to raise and/or review these latter issues. Taylor's raising of these issues in violation of the 
Court's order granting permissive appeal and of the Court order denying Taylor's cross appeal 
and in violation of the scope of review on permissive appeal is addressed below. 
2 
do these damages come from enforcing the Opinion Letter. The Opinion Letter is not the source 
document from which these damages spring. 
Taylor is seeking to enforce his right to recover under the illegal Stock Redemption 
Agreement. He is seeking to have his "illegal objects" carried out. He is seeking to obtain the 
benefit of the bargain under that illegal contract. The measure of damages sought by Taylor are 
the economic losses directly attributable to, or connected with, the Stock Redemption 
Agreement. Whatever the label, his present claim is an action or recovery based on an illegal 
agreement. However it is phrased, alleged or pleaded, Taylor is seeking to move himself from 
where this Court previously left him without remedy or recourse to seek damages under the 
Stock Redemption Agreement - to recovery of those very damages. The illegality doctrine 
precludes him from doing so. 
Taylor, attempting to use the illegality doctrine in his favor, argues that Riley is trying to 
derive a benefit from the illegal Stock Redemption Agreement which, he argues, the illegality 
doctrine prohibits. (Respondent's Brief, p. 41.) Taylor confuses an avoidance of liability with 
an affirmative benefit. Riley's alleged liability is avoided based on an illegal Agreement, while 
Taylor seeks an affirmative benefit in the form of damages available only if the contract had 
been enforceable.2 Avoidance of liability based on an illegal and unenforceable agreement is 
allowed; seeking to recover damages under the illegal contract against a party ( or agent of a 
party) is not. See Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33, 36,436 P.2d 248,251 (1968). 
2 Riley acknowledges that the consistent application of the illegality doctrine would relieve him 
from liability for the alleged negligence in drafting the Opinion Letter; but this avoidance is not a 
benefit, damage, relief or recovery under the illegal Stock Redemption Agreement. 
3 
Taylor argues that, because the transaction to redeem his shares should have been legal, 
the illegality doctrine cases and their holdings are distinguishable. (Respondent's Brief, p. 40.) 
Taylor previously asked this Court to allow him to pursue the damages he now seeks against 
Riley notwithstanding the illegality doctrine. This Court refused to do so. Taylor v. AJA 
Services, 151 Idaho 552, 565-567, 261 P.3d 839, 842-844 (2011). 
Exception to the bar to recovery under an illegal contract is based on a weighing process 
in recognition of situations in which relief to a party to an illegal contract is warranted to avoid 
undue harshly results. Id., 151 Idaho at 567, 261 P .3d at 844. "'Barring the strict application of 
the illegality doctrine, the central focus must be whether the ends of the law will be furthered or 
defeated by granting the reliefrequested."' Id. (quoting Trees, 138 Idaho at 9, 56 P.3d at 771.) 
Taylor cannot recover against an agent what this Court barred him from recovering from 
the principal. There is nothing about Taylor's present claim against Riley that changes this 
Court's prior determination that Taylor was not justifiably ignorant of the facts upon which 
illegality was based. Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 565, 261 P.3d at 842. "Nothing suggests that 
Reed Taylor, as CEO and Chairman of the Board, as well as majority shareholder, was justifiably 
ignorant as to the circumstances causing the illegality the insufficient earned surplus and 
absence of a shareholder vote explicitly authorizing the use of capital surplus." Id., 151 Idaho at 
565-566, 261 P.3d at 842-843. Nothing about Taylor's present claim against Riley changes this 
Court's holding that Taylor was not an innocent party; that Taylor was in pari delicto. Id. at 566, 
261 P.3d at 843. Taylor was in pari delicto because, "[i]f Reed Taylor was uninformed as to the 
4 
financial status of his corporation, that was a voluntary choice on his part and is insufficient to 
make him an innocent party to the agreement." Id. 3 
Nothing about Taylor's present claims against Riley changes this Court's findings that 
the Opinion Letter did not fraudulently induce Taylor to enter into the Stock Redemption 
Agreement or that the Stock Redemption Agreement is precisely the type of agreement worthy of 
prohibition since enforcing it would have drained AIA Services for the benefit of Taylor at the 
expense of minority shareholders and creditors. Id. at 567,261 P.3d at 844. 
Taylor also sought to avoid the strict application of the illegal doctrine based on his 
argument that "the Stock Redemption Agreement should be enforced given the malfeasance of 
the other parties and their attorneys in engineering this illegal agreement and unlawfully 
transferring millions of dollars from AIA Services to another entity, CropUSA." Id. (Emphasis 
added.) This Court recognized that not enforcing the agreement would be harsh "given that AIA 
Services is trying to get out of an agreement it chose to enter into and given that it appears that 
none of the parties recognized the potential violation of Idaho Code § 30-1-6. . . " Id. But, this 
Court felt that the harshness of allowing AIA Services to avoid payment was ameliorated by the 
fact Taylor had already received $9 million pursuant to the Stock Redemption Agreement, 
including $6.5 million in cash paid on two notes. Id. at n.3. 
Barring Taylor from recovering under the illegal Stock Redemption Agreement was 
upheld even as against allegations of attorney malfeasance and notwithstanding the fact that it 
allowed AIA Services "to get out of an agreement it chose to enter into. . .. " Taylor's present 
3 Taylor argues that reliance should not be an element of any duty owed by Riley and that if 
reliance is required he justifiably and reasonably relied on the advice given in the Opinion Letter. 
This Court has already determined that Taylor's reliance was neither reasonable nor justifiable. 
5 
claim for professional malpractice against Riley is simply another attempt to be excepted from 
the strict application of the illegality doctrine. That its application may seem harsh given that 
Riley may avoid liability for alleged negligence does not prevent application of the bar. 
Otherwise, the foundational requirement that the parties and their privies and agents to an alleged 
contract be left where the court finds them (without remedy or relief) would be eviscerated if a 
party could simply seek those same damages elsewhere.4 As between Taylor, a party to the 
illegal contract who has already been denied legal and equitable relief from the application of the 
strict bar of the illegality doctrine and Riley whose alleged worst act is a mistake in drafting an 
opinion letter, the illegality doctrine should operate most strongly against Taylor and preclude 
him from receiving that which he was previously denied - the benefits of the Stock Redemption 
Agreement. Taylor's claim against Riley for the very same amounts he would receive under the 
illegal agreement should continue to be barred by the illegality doctrine. 
B. TAYLOR'S PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST RILEY IS 
BARRED BY RES JUDICATA 
1. There is an Exact Identity of Parties with Respect to Riley. 
Taylor makes the incredible argument that the parties' and Riley's capacity are not the 
same and there is no privity for res judicata to apply in the instant case. (Respondent's Brief, p. 
30.) Riley was a named party in Riley Lawsuit #1. (R., p. 643.) Riley is a named party in the 
present lawsuit. (R., p. 41.) As the same party in both lawsuits, privity and Riley's capacity are 
wholly irrelevant. Arguing that there is no identity of parties with respect to Riley is frivolous. 
4 This is even more true if the new target for damages is an agent of a party to the illegal 
contract. 
6 
2. There is an Identity of Subject Matter of the Professional Malpractice 
Claims Alleged in Both Actions. 
a. Taylor's Present Claim for Professional Malpractice Was Asserted in the 
Prior Litigation. 
There is an identity of subject matter, regardless of the test used. It is undisputed that 
Taylor brought a professional malpractice claim against Riley in the prior litigation. (Riley 
Lawsuit #1) (R., p. 643-644.) It is undisputed that Taylor tried to improve his professional 
malpractice claim in his First Amended Complaint wherein he entitles it "Malpractice" 
specifically alleging that Riley owed him a duty by and through the Opinion Letter. (R., pp. 706-
708.) It is undisputed that Taylor brought a professional malpractice claim against Riley in the 
present litigation based on the Opinion Letter. (Riley Lawsuit #2) (R., pp. 41-43.) 
Res judicata bars re-litigation of a claim previously asserted. Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 
Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2009). There are no qualifiers when the same claim was 
previously brought. If a claim was previously brought, it is barred. Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 
Idaho 774, 777, 186 P3d 630, 633 (2008). In Andrus, plaintiffs alleged Idaho Code § 47-901 
granted them a "statutory right" to use a road in a 2003 lawsuit. Id. In a subsequent 2005 
lawsuit, plaintiffs alleged again that Idaho Code § 47-901 granted them a "statutory right" for 
mining purposes across the defendants' property for ingress and egress. Id. This Court applied 
res judicata to bar the subsequent action because the claim in the earlier lawsuit was the same 
claim. Id. Taylor previously brought a claim for professional malpractice against Riley. He is 
barred from doing so again. 
7 
b. Taylor's Present Claim, at a Minimum, Relates to His Prior Claim. 
Taylor argues that res judicata does not apply because his claims are based on different 
factual allegations. It is true that there are some different factual allegations against Riley.5 It is 
also true that the first complaint, the first amended complaint, and the present complaint have 
some of the same, or nearly the same, allegations against Riley. (R., pp. 25-50; 620-645; 672-
716.) The complaints all allege the prima facie elements for professional malpractice. Id. The 
complaints specifically allege that Riley committed professional malpractice. Id. The 
complaints refer to the Stock Redemption Agreement and related documents. Id. The 
complaints refer to the Opinion Letter. Id In both actions, Taylor seeks the same damages -
what he claims he was owed under the Stock Redemption Agreement and the Promissory Note. 
Id 
More specifically, Taylor alleged in Riley Lawsuit #1 that he was owed a duty as Riley's 
former client and/or as a third party beneficiary. (R., p. 644.) Taylor alleges the same status in 
Riley Lawsuit #2. (R., p. 35.) It is, in fact, Taylor's status as a third party beneficiary which is 
the basis for his request in both lawsuits that the Harrigfeld exception be extended to him. 
Taylor alleged in Riley Lawsuit #1 that Riley owed Taylor a "duty of care to provide ... 
professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with the standard of care in the 
legal professional." (R., p. 644.) Taylor alleges in Riley Lawsuit #2 that Riley owed him "a 
duty of care to provide ... professional legal advice in keeping with the standard of care in the 
legal profession." (R., p. 42.) Taylor alleged in Riley Lawsuit #1 that Riley breached the 
5 Taylor also accuses Riley of selectively quoting from the various complaints. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 22-23.) A careful review of Riley's Brief shows that he was not quoting but 
summarizing. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 25-26.) 
8 
standard of care in the legal profession which caused damage to Taylor and that Riley's acts 
"constitute professional negligence." (R., p. 644.) Taylor alleges in Riley Lawsuit #2 that Riley 
breached the duty of care owed to Taylor, that Taylor was damaged thereby and that Riley's acts 
were "professional negligence." (R., pp. 42-43.) Most telling, for res judicata purposes, Taylor 
alleged in Riley Lawsuit # 1 that Riley was responsible for issuing opinion letters relating to the 
transaction which included various applicable representations and warranties; that Riley owed 
Taylor special duties by and through the Opinion Letter representing such facts as the 
transactions being fully legal and authorized by the corporations, which thereby invoked 
personal liability to Riley; that Taylor had a right to rely on the representations in the Opinion 
Letter; that Riley breached his duties, which constituted professional negligence; and that 
conduct damaged Taylor. (R., pp. 697, 704, 707-710, 713.) Taylor makes the same allegations 
in Riley Lawsuit #2. (R., pp. 25-50.) 
It is true, that in Riley Lawsuit #1, the focus of these allegations was that Riley breached 
his duties owed to Taylor by taking a contrary position to the Opinion Letter (that the Stock 
Redemption was illegal). But that is exactly the point. Taylor alleged professional malpractice 
in Riley Lawsuit #1 based, in part, upon Riley's authoring the Opinion Letter and the 
representations and warranties allegedly expressed therein,6 arguing that if the Stock Redemption 
Agreement was illegal meant the Opinion Letter was incorrect. Taylor has alleged in Riley 
6 Riley contends that an opinion is an expression of professional judgment, not a representation 
or warranty. Unlike a business buyer who is entitled to damages for breach of a representation or 
warranty in a stock purchase agreement if the representation or warranty is incorrect (regardless 
of whether negligently made), an opinion recipient is entitled to damages from an opinion giver 
only if the opinion was negligently prepared. An incorrect opinion is not actionable unless 
negligently prepared. 
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Lawsuit #2 that in connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement, Riley drafted and 
delivered to Taylor an incorrect Opinion Letter relating to the same transaction which included 
substantial factual and legal representations that the redemption was authorized and was not in 
violation of applicable Idaho laws; that Taylor was a third party beneficiary of Riley's legal 
representation of AIA Services; that Riley owed Taylor duties by and through the Opinion 
Letter; that Riley is personally liable to Taylor; and that Riley's acts breached his duties which 
constituted professional negligence which damaged Taylor. (R., pp. 29, 35-36, 41-43.)7 
Even if Taylor's present claim for professional malpractice is not considered the same 
claim as brought in Riley Lawsuit # 1, res judicata bars any claims relating to the same cause of 
action previously brought. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805. Consequently, even if 
the allegations supporting professional malpractice in Riley Lawsuit #1 focused on litigation 
conduct and the allegations supporting professional malpractice in Riley Lawsuit #2 focused on 
the Opinion Letter, both suits relate to professional malpractice. 
C. Taylor's Present Claim for Professional Malpractice Arose Out of the 
Same Transaction or Series of Transactions. 
Riley Lawsuit #1 arose out of the AIA Lawsuit. The AIA Lawsuit arose out of the Stock 
Redemption Agreement. Riley Lawsuit #2 arose out of the Opinion Letter prepared by Riley 
pursuant to the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
Res judicata bars re-litigation of any claim arising out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions or any part of the transaction or series of transactions. Diamond v. Farmers Group, 
7 Taylor also alleged in the present action that Riley raised the illegality defense to the Stock 
Redemption Agreement breached duties owed him because doing so was contrary to 
representations of fact and law therein and that Riley inappropriately represented corporate 
entities adversely to Taylor's interests. (R., p. 35, ,r 24.) 
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Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990); Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461,464, 
757 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1998). The professional malpractice claim brought by Taylor in Riley 
Lawsuit #1 arose, ultimately, out of the Stock Redemption Agreement. The professional 
malpractice claim brought by Taylor in Riley Lawsuit #2 arose directly out of the Stock 
Redemption Agreement. That Riley Lawsuit #1 arose out of litigation that arose out of the Stock 
Redemption Agreement does not change the fact that Riley Lawsuit #1 arose out of the same 
transaction that is the foundation to all of his lawsuits - the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
Res judicata applies even if there is not a substantial overlap between the theories of 
liability advanced in support of a claim or in the supporting evidence relating to those theories. 
Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437-39, 849 P.2d 107, 110-113 (1993). 
Here, there is a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of Taylor's claims 
and there is at least some overlap in the evidence relating to those theories. Taylor's professional 
malpractice claim in the present action is barred under the transactional approach. 
d. Taylor's Present Claim for Professional Malpractice Could Have and 
Should Have Been Brought in the Prior Litigation. 
If Taylor's present professional malpractice claim could have been brought in Riley 
Lawsuit# 1, it is barred by res judicata. 
"[I]n an action between the same parties upon the same claim or 
demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not 
only as to every matter offered and received to sustain and defeat 
the claim, but also every matter which might and should have been 
litigated in the first suit." 
Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 127 Idaho 558, 560, 903 P.2d 147, 149 (Ct.App. 1995) 
(quoting Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610,614, 26 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1992). 
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Taylor argues that, as a matter of timing, he could not have brought his present claim for 
professional malpractice in Riley Lawsuit #1 because: (i) his present claim did not accrue until 
June 17, 2009, when Judge Brudie ruled that the Stock Redemption Agreement was both illegal 
and unenforceable and; (ii) the complaint in Riley Lawsuit #1 was dismissed six months before 
this ruling. (Respondent's Brief, p. 24.) However, Taylor relies on the wrong date for the 
accrual of his present claim; and the present claim could have been brought in Riley Lawsuit # 1, 
either before or even after Judge Brudie's ruling. 
(i) The Operative Facts Underlying Taylor's Present Professional 
Malpractice Claim Were Known Before the Dismissal of the 
Complaint in Riley Lawsuit # 1. 
Taylor was aware of the operative facts underlying his present professional malpractice 
claim before the complaint in Riley Lawsuit #1 was dismissed and, therefore, by definition, 
before Judge Brudie's subsequent ruling that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and 
unenforceable. In fact, Taylor knew the operative facts before Riley Lawsuit #1 was filed. 
On April 16, 2008, the Defendants in the AIA lawsuit raised the defense that the Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement was unenforceable because it constituted an illegal contract. 
(R., pp. 1950-1960.) On July 21, 2008, Taylor, through his attorney, sent a letter to AIA 
demanding that it sue Riley and others because he had provided a legal opinion counter to the 
illegality defense that had been raised. (R., pp. 379-382.) On August 5, 2008, Taylor, through 
his attorney, sent an email making additional threats to sue Riley and others based, in part, on the 
Opinion Letter. (R., p. 377.) The email stated that "even if the illegality argument had merit, 
Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor would be suing Hawley Troxell (and Richard Riley) in such an 
instance, regardless of the circumstances." Id. (Parenthetical in original) Riley Lawsuit #1 was 
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subsequently filed on August 18, 2008. (R., p. 643.) Taylor could have, and should have, 
alleged negligent preparation of an Opinion Letter as an alternative theory before it was 
dismissed on December 23, 2008. (R., pp. 480-515.) 
This Court has previously examined, in the context of res judicata, what constitutes the 
degree of knowledge regarding a potential claim necessary to trigger a party's duty to discover 
that claim and raise it in the first action. In Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 
434,437, 849 P.2d 107, 111 (1993), this Court examined whether the plaintiff had exercised due 
diligence to discover in a prior action the fraud claim that was the subject of a subsequent action. 
Magic Valley, 123 Idaho at 437, 849 P.2d at 110. This Court explained that this was the third 
lawsuit arising out of a contract dispute. In Magic Valley I the theories of breach of contract and 
tortious conduct were litigated. Magic Valley II concerned issues of damages, attorney fees, and 
the status of security posted on appeal in Magic Valley I. Magic Valley III sought to hold 
individuals liable for the judgment entered in the prior litigation by piercing the corporate veil.8 
Regarding the amount of knowledge needed to trigger res judicata, this Court found that 
"Magic Valley was on notice in Magic Valley !that there might be a basis to pierce the corporate 
veil of PBS to hold the Kolouchs liable." Id., 123 Idaho at 439, 849 P.2d at 112. (Emphasis 
added.) Based on that finding, this Court reached the following conclusion: "Magic Valley did 
8 Interestingly, this Court held in Magic Valley III that the two prior lawsuits arose out of the 
same transaction, even though the theory of liability and the evidence necessary to prove liability 
was different in the subsequent action than in the prior litigation and dismissed the corporate 
piercing claim as barred by res judicata. Magic Valley III, 123 Idaho at 438-439, 849 P.2d at 
111-112. The three cases in Magic Valley are not unlike the three cases in the present matter. 
Magic Valley I is like the AIA lawsuit in that both sought a determination of liability based on an 
underlying contract. Magic Valley II is like Riley Lawsuit #1 in that they both arose out of the 
initial litigation. Magic Valley III is like the present action in that both Plaintiffs seek to collect 
damages from an alternative source. 
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not exercise due diligence to discover its claim to pierce the corporate veil." Id. Of note, this 
Court determined that notice is only needed that there might be a basis for a cause of action or 
remedy. Id A party need not have perfect knowledge of or certainty that a cause of action exists 
before res judicata is triggered. 
This Court previously rejected the argument that a claim is not ripe until the judge makes 
an adverse ruling in the prior litigation. In Berkshire Investments LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 
83, 278 P.3d 943, 953 (2012), this Court barred numerous causes of action that were actually 
raised in the prior litigation. Id. 513 Idaho at 82-83, 278 P.3d 952-3. This Court also barred 
other claims because they stemmed either from the same transaction (the sale of real property) or 
the subsequent lawsuit over that transaction. Id. The Mailes argued, as Taylor does here, that 
these latter claims were not ripe until the alleged misrepresentation resulted in Judge Wilper's 
adverse judgment. Id. This Court noted that "[a]ll of the conduct on which those claims are 
based - the execution of the Disclaimer, the filing of the Taylors' petition for appointment as 
trustees, and the filing of the amended complaint - occurred and was made known to the Mailes 
while [the prior litigation] was pending, before Judge Wilper even proceeded to the merits of the 
case." Id. A party cannot await an adverse ruling before asserting a cause of action, if the 
operative facts are known. See id 
This Court has already determined that Taylor knew of the facts upon which illegality 
was based or, if he did not, he was not justifiably ignorant of them. Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 
565, 566, 261 P.3d at 842-843. Taylor was, at a minimum, on notice that there "might" be a 
basis for a malpractice claim against Riley before Riley Lawsuit #1 was dismissed. In actuality, 
Taylor's threat to sue Riley "even if the illegality argument had merit" and "regardless of the 
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circumstances" shows that Taylor knew that there was a cause of action. (R., p. 377.) If, as 
Taylor argues, he did not bring the present professional malpractice claim in the prior litigation, 
it can only be because he did not exercise the necessary due diligence to do so. 
The operative facts were known to Taylor before Judge Brodie's ruling, before Riley 
Lawsuit #1 was dismissed and even before it was filed. He was on notice of a potential claim 
against Riley based on the alleged negligent preparation of the Opinion Letter. He could have 
and therefore was required to bring his present claim in that prior lawsuit. 
(ii) Taylor's Present Professional Malpractice Claim Accrued Before 
Judge Brodie's June 16, 2009 Illegality Ruling. 
Taylor argues that his present malpractice claim did not accrue until June 17, 2009, when 
Judge Brudie made his illegality ruling. (Respondent's Brief, p. 24.) To the contrary, Taylor's 
present malpractice claim accrued no later than April 16, 2008.9 This date occurred before Judge 
Brodie's ruling, before the complaint in Riley Lawsuit #1 was dismissed on December 23, 2008 
and before it was filed, Taylor could have and should have brought the present professional 
malpractice claim in that prior litigation. 
Accrual of a professional malpractice claim is determined under the "some damage" rule. 
Reynolds v. Trout, Jones, et al., 154 Idaho 21, 293 P.3d 645, 648 (2013). Taylor was damaged 
no later than April 16, 2008. As of that date, he had been damaged in the following respects: (1) 
he had parted with his stock; (2) AIA had notified him that he would not be paid because the 
9 Riley believes that Taylor's professional malpractice claim accrued when Taylor admittedly 
incurred "some damage" in 1995 upon issuance of the Opinion Letter. Riley does not intend to 
waive this position by arguing April 16, 2008, as the latest possible accrual date for purposes of 
this appeal. 
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contract was illegal and, therefore, unenforceable (i.e., notice of default); and (3) he had incurred 
attorney fees challenging the illegality defense. 
The determination of what constitutes both damage and objective proof must be decided 
"on the circumstances of each case." Trout, 154 Idaho at __ , 293 P.3d at 649. In Trout, this 
Court examined, in the context of a professional malpractice action, when "some damage" 
occurred. The competing dates proffered were (1) when a party to the real estate contract 
refused to refund earnest money (notice of default); (2) when Reynolds, the malpractice plaintiff, 
incurred attorney fees in an effort to recovery that earnest money; or (3) the date the district 
court, in the underlying litigation, granted a motion for summary judgment. Id, 154 Idaho at 
__ , 293 P.3d at 648. This Court rejected the date of the district court's ruling in favor of the 
last possible date for notice of default (i.e., when the malpractice plaintiff filed the underlying 
lawsuit seeking a refund of the earnest money). Id., 154 Idaho at __ , 293 P.3d at 650. The 
Court determined that the damage the malpractice plaintiff suffered was the $60,000.00 in 
earnest money that Quasar refused to refund. Id Likewise, Taylor's damage here occurred, at 
the latest, when AIA refused to pay under the Stock Redemption Agreement because it was 
illegal and therefore unenforceable. 
In Trout, this Court noted that the alleged negligence was the attorney's failure to include 
clear language in the real estate agreement regarding when the full amount of the earnest money 
was to be refunded. Id. This Court further noted that until Quasar refused to refund the earnest 
money, any negligent draftsmanship only created the potential for harm or increased the risk that 
Quasar would not pay. Here, Taylor argues that until Judge Brudie ruled his damages were only 
hypothetical. However, this Court ruled that once Quasar refused to pay, the harm from the 
16 
alleged negligence accrued. Id Likewise, once AIA raised the illegality defense to payment, 
thereby making the Opinion Letter inconsistent with the defense, Taylor's harm from the alleged 
negligently drafted Opinion Letter claim accrued. 
Reynolds, the malpractice plaintiff, contended that no damage occurred at that time 
(notice of default) because it was still possible that Quasar could have refunded the earnest 
money. Here, Taylor argues that until Judge Brudie ruled the Stock Redemption Agreement was 
illegal, any negligent draftsmanship only created the potential for harm or increased the risk that 
AIA would not pay because it was still possible that AIA would be required to pay if the 
illegality defense was unsuccessful. This Court held in Trout, however, the fact that a loss might 
be cured by some future event does not mean that the cause of action has not accrued. Id This 
Court likened Reynolds' circumstances to those in Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 
(1985), where there was negligence in the preparation of a tax return. This Court held that there 
was no damage until the IRS discovered the error and assessed interest and penalties against the 
client. Id at 178, 706 P.2d at 67. At that time the taxpayer incurred "some damage" even if the 
IRS subsequently withdrew its assessment or a later court held it invalid. In Trout, this Court 
found that Quasar's failure to immediately refund the earnest money is analogous to the IRS 
assessments. Here, AIA's refusal to pay based on the illegality doctrine is analogous to the IRS 
assessments in Streib and the notice of default in Trout. Taylor's present claim accrued no later 
than April of 2008. He could have and should have brought his claim in the prior lawsuit. 
Regardless, Taylor has conceded that he suffered "some damages" when Judge Brudie 
ruled that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable. Even accepting this 
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ruling as the accrual of Taylor's malpractice claim against Riley, that claim accrued during the 
pendency of Riley Lawsuit #1 and could have been brought in that prior litigation. 
(iii) Riley Lawsuit #1 Was Not Yet Concluded When Judge Brudie 
Ruled that the Stock Redemption Agreement Was Illegal and 
Unenforceable. 
Taylor's argument that it was impossible for him to assert his present claims in Riley 
Lawsuit #1 until Judge Brudie made his determination on June 17, 2009 that the Stock 
Redemption Transaction was illegal, is wrong. Riley Lawsuit #1 was still pending at that time 
and Taylor could have asserted his present claim in that prior lawsuit. 
The complaint in Riley Lawsuit #1 was indeed dismissed on December 23, 2008, before 
Judge Brudie's ruling on June 17, 2009. (R., p. 480-515.) However, after the complaint was 
dismissed Taylor filed a notice of appeal on January 30, 2009. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 
826, 831, 243 P .3d 642, 64 7 (2010). Judge Brudie' s ruling, in the AIA Lawsuit, on June 17, 
2009, that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable was made while the 
appeal was pending in Riley Lawsuit #1. Subsequent to Judge Brudie's ruling, on March 16, 
2010, this Court determined there was no final judgment and remanded Riley Lawsuit #1 to the 
district court for entry of final judgment. Id. A final judgment was entered and this Court 
received it on March 24, 2010. Id. 
While a lawsuit is on appeal, a district court retains the power and authority to rule upon 
various motions and take various actions. I.A.R. Rule 11. During the pendency of an appeal, a 
district court retains authority to rule upon any motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to Rule 
1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) states that a motion for 
reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the 
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entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of final judgment. 
I.R.C.P., Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B). A dismissal of a complaint is an interlocutory order until a final 
judgment or Rule 54(b) certificate is signed. Idaho First National Bank v. David Steed & 
Associates, Inc., 121 Idaho 356, 361, 825 P.2d 79, 84 (1992). A trial court can consider new 
facts or evidence upon a motion for reconsideration. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 471-
72, 147 P.3d 100, 103-4 (Ct.App. 2006). Rule ll(a)(2)(B) provides express authority for a 
district court to reconsider and vacate interlocutory orders. Telford v. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 932, 
934,950 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1998). 
When Judge Brodie made his ruling on June 17, 2009, there was no final judgment or 
Rule 54(b) certificate in Riley Lawsuit # 1. The dismissal of the complaint was an interlocutory 
order. The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction to rule upon a motion for reconsideration 
based on new facts or evidence. Taylor claims that Judge Brodie's ruling on June 17, 2009, 
created new, material operative facts comprising a second transaction allowing a second suit to 
proceed. (Respondent's Brief, p. 24.) Taylor could have brought these new, material operative 
facts to Judge Brodie's attention on a motion to reconsider the motion to dismiss and/or motion 
to amend his complaint. 10 Taylor could have done so up to and including fourteen (14) days 
after entry of final judgment in March 2010. Taylor had nine (9) months after Judge Brodie's 
ruling to present his claim in Riley Lawsuit #1. 
These new, material operative facts would have been based on non-litigation conduct 
(i.e., negligently drafting an Opinion Letter) and, therefore, would have been ripe and unaffected 
10 Taylor concedes this by arguing he could still pursue a motion for reconsideration on other 
issues on remand in the present lawsuit pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2). (Respondent's Brief, p. 
44.) 
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by the pendency of the underlying AIA Lawsuit. Had Taylor brought a motion for 
reconsideration based on these new facts and because drafting the Opinion Letter is not based on 
litigation conduct, Taylor could have avoided the dismissal of at least part of his complaint. 
Taylor could have, and therefore should have, brought his present claim for professional 
malpractice against Riley in Riley Lawsuit # 1. Because he failed to do so, that claim is barred. 
3. There Was Finality of Judgment in Riley Lawsuit #1. 
Final judgment was entered in Riley Lawsuit #1 upon remand by this Court to the district 
court. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 831, 243 P.3d at 647. The final judgment was based on 
dismissal of Taylor's complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and denial of 
Taylor's motion to amend. "[D]ismissal for failure to state a claim precludes a second action 
that presents the same claim through a better complaint." C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4439, at p. 358 (1981). See also Mervin v. FTC, 591 F.2d 
821, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(holding that dismissal of a prior action for failure to state a cause 
of action operates to bar a second action. "This was an adjudication on the merits having full res 
judicata effect."); Mirin v. Nevada, 547 F.2d 911, 94 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 432 U.S. 906, 
97 S.Ct. 2952, 53 L.Ed.2d 1079 (holding that dismissal of a prior action for failure to state a 
cause of action "operates as an absolute bar to a second suit between the same parties or their 
privies based on the same cause of action, not only in respect of every matter actually litigated, 
but also as to every ground of recovery or defense which might have been presented"); Carter v. 
Money Tree Co., 532 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 426 U.S. 925, 96 S.Ct. 2636, 49 
L.Ed.2d 380 ("A dismissal for failure to state a claim is res judicata as to the then existing claim 
which plaintiff was attempting to state . . . . If, upon dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff 
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seeks leave to file an amended complaint and such leave is denied with prejudice, the denial is 
res judicata as to any claim made by plaintiff in that amended complaint." (emphasis added)); 
Huvicki v. ACF Industries, Inc., 484 F.2d 519, 523 (3rd Cir. 1973)("[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
raises matters in bar and results in a judgment on the merits."). The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of 
the complaint in Riley Lawsuit #1 and the denial of the motion to amend the complaint acted as a 
final adjudication on the merits of all claims actually asserted, all claims related to those claims 
actually asserted, and all claims that could and therefore should have been asserted. 
Taylor argues that his complaint in Riley Lawsuit #1 was not adjudicated on the merits 
because the complaint was dismissed and the motion to amend was denied on the basis of the 
litigation privilege. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 26-27.) He argues that even if he had pled his 
present claims in that prior litigation, those claims were not ripe for adjudication until the AIA 
Lawsuit had concluded because this Court said in Riley Lawsuit #1 that a cause of action against 
an adversary's attorney cannot be instituted prior to the resolution of the underlying litigation. 
First, Taylor's claims in Riley Lawsuit # 1 were not dismissed solely on the basis of the 
litigation privilege. This Court did a full and separate analysis of each of Taylor's claims to 
determine whether he sufficiently stated a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6). McNichols, 149 
Idaho at 843-848, 243 P.3d at 659-664. This Court specifically reviewed whether Taylor stated a 
cause of action for malpractice based on his status as a third-party beneficiary of Riley's 
representation of AIA in connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement separate and apart 
from his status as an adversary. Id., 149 Idaho at 845, 243 P.3d at 661. In addition, this Court 
reviewed the decision to deny Taylor's motion to file an amended complaint (which included 
malpractice claims against Riley) separate and apart from the litigation privilege. Id. 149 Idaho 
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at 847,243 P.3d at 663. Both the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and the denial of the motion to amend 
are deemed adjudications on the merits of the malpractice claim. See citations, infra. 
Second, Taylor cannot claim a lack of adjudication on the merits on claims he could 
have, and should have, but failed to bring in the first litigation. These claims, by definition, are 
not adjudicated on the merits, yet res judicata applies. Taylor cannot use his own lack of 
diligence in failing to bring his present claim in the prior litigation to argue that because he failed 
to do so, there was a lack of adjudication on the merits. 
Third, this Court's holding raising the timing of claims challenging litigation conduct in 
Riley Lawsuit #1 does not apply. That holding was limited to a claim brought against one 
party's opponent's attorney in underlying litigation, based on conduct the attorney committed in 
the course of that underlying litigation. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 839,243 P.3d at 655. 11 Only 
then is an adverse party precluded from suing prior to the resolution of that litigation. Taylor's 
present claim is not based on conduct Riley committed in the course of the AIA Lawsuit. 
Taylor's present claim is based on Riley's alleged negligence in preparing an Opinion Letter in 
1995, 12 years before the AIA Lawsuit was filed. Taylor was not required to await the 
conclusion of the AIA Lawsuit before he could bring his present malpractice claim. 12 
Fourth, Taylor appears to be conflating Buxton and Taylor v. McNichols in arguing that 
he had to wait for the resolution of the AIA Lawsuit before he could bring his present 
professional malpractice claim against Riley. A review of professional negligence cases reveals 
11 This holding is not inconsistent with res judicata because Riley was not a party to the AIA 
Lawsuit, whereas res judicata applies when, as here, Riley was a party to Riley Lawsuit #1 and 
#2. 
12 Under Taylor's theory, he could not have filed the present lawsuit on October 1, 2009 because 
the AIA Lawsuit was still pending. 
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that resolution of underlying litigation is not always a prerequisite for suing the attorney or other 
professional. Sometimes the underlying litigation has been concluded before the malpractice 
case is filed. Often, however, the underlying litigation is still pending, and in other instances, no 
underlying litigation has yet been filed. An Idaho example is Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 
706 P.2d 63 (1985), which was an action for professional malpractice in which it was alleged 
that an accountant negligently claimed certain liabilities as being tax deductible on the plaintiffs' 
federal income tax returns when, in fact, such liabilities were not tax deductible. Id., l 09 Idaho 
at 179, 706 P.2d at 63. As a result, the IRS disallowed the deductions and assessed additional 
liability in the form of interest and penalties in the amount of more than $150,000. Id. The issue 
was when did the plaintiffs suffer damages which gave rise to a cause of action and, thus, 
commenced the running of the statute of limitation. This Court held in Streib that "no damages 
accrued to the plaintiffs until the time of the Internal Revenue Service's assessment of penalties 
and interest." Id., 109 Idaho at 179, 706 P.2d at 67. This Court reasoned that the preparation of 
income tax returns contemplates a review by the IRS "with damages resulting at that time if the 
returns have been erroneously prepared." Id. 109 Idaho at 179, 706 P.2d at 68 (emphasis in 
original). This Court quoted with approval from Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 
1967) as follows: 
[W]e have concluded that the plaintiff's cause of action did not 
arise until the tax deficiency was assessed by the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue. Prior to assessment the plaintiff had not been 
injured. That is, assessment was the factor essential to 
consummate the wrong - only then was the tort completed. If a 
deficiency had never been assessed, the plaintiff would not have 
been harmed and therefore would have no cause of action. . . . In 
short, in the absence of assessment, injury would not have 
inevitably resulted. 
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Id., l 09 Idaho at 177, 706 P.2d at 66. 
It was not required in Streib that the taxpayer first litigate with the IRS the issue of 
whether the tax was due. It is possible that the IRS' s position was incorrect and the taxpayer 
would have prevailed in that underlying litigation. If the Buxton rule as interpreted by Taylor 
were applied, then contrary to Streib it would have been a prerequisite that the taxpayer file and 
conclude such litigation before the taxpayer would have a cause of action against his 
accountant. 13 
Numerous cases m a number of jurisdictions have held that a cause of action for 
professional malpractice in connection with negligent tax advice or the negligent preparation of 
tax returns commences upon the issuance of a tax deficiency notice by the taxing authority; it is 
not necessary to litigate the tax issue before suing the professional. See CDT v. Addison, 
Roberts & Ludwig, 198 Ariz. 173, 7 P.3d 979 (Ct.App. 2000); Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 
288,257 A.2d 421 (1969); Snipes v. Jackson, 69 N.C.App. 64,316 S.E.2d 657 (1984); LaMure 
v. Peters, 122 N.M. 367, 924 P.2d 1379 (Ct.App. 1996); Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554 (Wyo. 
1989) (statute of limitations for malpractice action based on advice leading to increased federal 
tax liability began to run when the taxpayers received the statutory notice of deficiency); Noel v. 
Hoover, 12 P.3d 328 (Co.App. 2000); Murphy v. Mullin, Hoard & Brown, 168 S.W.3d 288 
(Tex.App.-Dallas 2005) (cause of action for legal malpractice accrued when taxpayers received a 
13 Buxton supports the accrual of Taylor's claim before the conclusion of the underlying 
litigation. In that case this Court held that certain of the counts brought by the City of McCall 
against its attorneys based on negligent advice accrued and "some damage" occurred during the 
pendency of the underlying lawsuit and were properly dismissed as untimely. Buxton, 146 Idaho 
at 663,201 P.3d at 636. The "some damage" arose on the date the City lost its opportunity to 
recover and lost its opportunity to settle for a specified amount. Id. Likewise, here Taylor lost 
the opportunity to recover when the illegality defense was raised or at the latest when Judge 
Brudie made his illegality ruling. 
24 
tax deficiency notice from the Internal Revenue Service); Logemann Bros. Co. v. Redlin Browne, 
SC, 205 Wis.2d 356, 556 N.W.2d 388 (Ct.App. 1996); Rochester v. Campbell, 910 S.W.2d 647 
(Tex.App.-Austin 1995); Khan v. Deutsche Bank, 2012 Ill. 112219, 978 N.E.2d 1020 (2012). 14 
In Ponder v. Brice & Manko.ff, 889 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.App. - Houston 1994), an investor 
in tax-shelter partnerships sued the attorneys who issued opinion letters pertaining to the tax 
consequences of the partnerships. The attorneys argued that the cause of action accrued and the 
statute of limitation began to run when the IRS issued a deficiency letter notifying the investors 
that additional taxes would be assessed. Id., 889 S.W.2d at 641-2. The investors argued that 
their cause of action did not accrue until they had litigated the matter and an opinion had been 
issued by the tax court sustaining the IRS position. Id. Ruling for the defendant attorneys, the 
court held that the investors' cause of action accrued when they should have become aware that 
there was some concrete and specific risk of harm to their legally protected interests. Id. Upon 
receipt of a notice of deficiency each taxpayer knew or should have known that the IRS was 
assessing additional taxes. Id. There was no requirement that the matter be litigated to 
conclusion before the malpractice claim ripened. 
Resolution, or even instigation, of underlying litigation has not been required as a 
condition precedent to suing an attorney opinion-giver in other situations. For example, in 
Primus Automotive Financial Services, Inc. v. Otto-Wal, Inc., 2000 WL 621176 (N.D.Ohil. 
2000), it was held that a cause of action accrued against the opinion-givers when a car dealership 
became insolvent and was unable to pay its loans to the plaintiff. In Sirote & Permut, P. C. v 
14 Cf. Corporex Cos., LLC v Prokauer Rose, LLP, 713 F.Supp.2d 678 (E.D. Ky. 2010), holding 
that the cause of action of taxpayers who invested in a tax shelter against attorneys who issued 
opinion letters did not accrue until the taxpayers settled underlying litigation with the IRS. 
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Bennett, 776 So.2d 40 (Ala. 2000), the court held that the cause of action of the purchasers of 
revenue bonds against the attorneys who issued opinion letters regarding the validity and 
enforceability of the bonds accrued when they purchased the bonds, not when the bonds were 
later held by a court to be invalid. In Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v. Jackson, Brouillette, Pohl 
& Kirley, P.C., 912 S.W.2d 536 (Mo.App. 1995), the plaintiff sued a law firm for negligence in 
the preparation of an opinion letter while underlying litigation regarding the validity of a real 
estate loan was still pending. In Mega Group, Inc. v. Pechenik & Curro, P.C., 819 N.Y.S.2d 796 
(2006), the plaintiff was allowed to file suit against attorneys who gave an opinion regarding the 
legality of the sale of corporate stock even though litigation over the legality of the stock sale 
was still pending and had not been resolved. In National Bank of Canada v. Hale & Dorr, L.P., 
2004 WL 1049072 (Mass. 2004), the defendant attorneys gave an opinion in connection with a 
loan transaction that there was no pending or threatened litigation in any forum that would have a 
material adverse affect on the borrower's business. However, there was litigation then pending 
against the borrower. The lender was allowed to sue the opinion-givers before the underlying 
litigation was resolved. Similarly, in Banco Popular North America v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 
(N.J. 2005), an opinion giver was sued while underlying litigation was still pending. 
The rule that resolution of underlying litigation is not a prerequisite to accrual of a cause 
of action against an attorney for professional negligence is not universal. In Warnock v. Karm 
Winand & Patterson, 876 N.E.2d 8 (Ill.App. 2007), the court held that a cause of action accrued 
against an attorney for professional negligence in connection with the drafting of real estate sale 
documents only from the date of an adverse judgment entered against the attorney's clients, 
stating: 
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[A] cause of action for legal malpractice will rarely accrue prior to 
entry of an adverse judgment, settlement, or dismissal of the 
underlying action in which the plaintiff has become entangled due 
to the purportedly negligent advice of his attorney. 
Id., 376 Ill.App.3d at 371,876 N.E.2d at 15. 
However, Warnock and its ilk were modified by the subsequent case of Bluewater 
Partners, Inc. v. Edwin D. Mason, Foley and Lardner, 975 N.E.2d 284 (Ill.App. 2012). The 
facts are somewhat convoluted, but the Court in Bluewater limited what it referred to as the 
"adverse judgment accrual rule" to situations in which the claimant ( e.g., Taylor) is the 
defendant in the underlying litigation. 15 "Public policy favors such a delay to permit a 
determination as to whether the advice of counsel was in fact negligent. If the malpractice 
plaintiff is found not liable in the underlying suit, then the favorable determination of the suit 
forecloses the element of damages." Bluewater, 975 N.E.2d at 301 (citation omitted). The rule 
is otherwise, according to the Bluewater court, where the claimant is the plaintiff in the 
underlying litigation. Id. Under the facts of the Bluewater case, the court held that the client's 
cause of action for malpractice against the attorneys accrued contemporaneously with the 
plaintiffs cause of action against their client. 
Applying the Bluewater holding to the present case leads to the conclusion Taylor was 
not precluded from litigating his present claim until after the AIA Lawsuit was concluded. He 
was the plaintiff in that litigation. His cause of action against Riley accrued, at the latest, 
contemporaneously with AIA's repudiation of the contract on the grounds of illegality. At that 
15 This distinguishes Buxton and makes it inapplicable here. In Buxton, the malpractice claimant 
(City of McCall) was the defendant in the underlying construction litigation out of which the 
City's attorney's conduct arose. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 657-658, 201 P.3d 629, 630-1 (2009). 
In contract, Taylor was the plaintiff in the AIA Lawsuit. 
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point, Reed Taylor suffered objectively ascertainable damages, and "judicial economy favored 
resolving the related claims in a single suit." Bluewater, 975 N.E.2d 303. 
The weight of authority is that resolution of underlying litigation is not a condition 
precedent to accrual of a cause of action for professional liability. Even in the jurisdiction which 
has adopted the "adverse judgment accrual rule," the rule is limited to situations in which the 
claimant was the defendant in the underlying suit. 
Nonetheless, Taylor argues that he should not have been required to plead a cause of 
action against Riley in Riley Lawsuit #1 based upon the Opinion Letter on the surmise that the 
AIA Lawsuit would be decided adversely to him. Taken to its logical conclusion, Taylor's 
argument would mean that, unless he first sued AIA, his cause of action against Riley for 
negligent preparation of the Opinion Letter would never accrue. Taylor was clearly notified that 
AIA had repudiated the contract on the ground of illegality, and Taylor suffered objectively 
ascertainable damages at that time in the form of attorney's fees incurred in litigating the issue. 
When Taylor elected to sue Riley in Riley Lawsuit #1 before the AIA Lawsuit was resolved, he 
was obligated by principles of res judicata to plead all claims which he possessed against Riley 
at that time. 
Taylor's present claim for professional malpractice against Riley was ripe during the 
pendency of Riley Lawsuit #1 and could have been brought in that action. Neither Buxton nor 
Taylor v. McNichols required Taylor to await the outcome of the AIA Lawsuit. The present 
claim is not based on conduct Riley committed in the course of the AIA Lawsuit. Taylor himself 
concedes that he was damaged by Judge Brudie's illegality holding. (Respondent's Brief, p. 29.) 
Riley Lawsuit #1 was still pending at that time. There was no need to await the final resolution 
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of that lawsuit before bringing his present claim. Because Riley could have brought his present 
malpractice claim in Riley Lawsuit #1, his present claim is barred by res judicata. 
There is an exact identity of parties relating to Riley in both lawsuits. There is an identity 
of subject matter in that Taylor actually brought his present claim in the prior litigation, or the 
claim arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions, or the present claim could have, 
and therefore should have, been brought in the prior action. There was finality of judgment in 
Riley Lawsuit #1. Taylor's claim for professional malpractice against Riley in this action is 
barred and the district court should be reversed. 
C. TAYLOR HAS WAIVED AND/OR RELEASED HIS CLAIM OF 
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST RILEY. 
Taylor waived his claim against Riley when he chose not to sue on the 1995 Agreement 
and its attendant Opinion Letter when AIA defaulted. He chose instead to remedy the default by 
restructuring the Stock Redemption Agreement. Taylor also waived his claim when he did not 
require or obtain an opinion letter for the restructured agreement, thereby ending the role of the 
Opinion Letter. Taylor also released his claim against Riley when he restructured the deal. 
A party to a contract has a choice of remedies upon breach or default. Koch v. Glenn, 53 
Idaho 761, 762, 27 P.2d 870, 871 (1933). Choosing one remedy over another necessarily waives 
the remedy not chosen. See Keesee v. Fetzek, 106 Idaho 507, 681 P.2d 600 (Ct.App. 1984). 
When AIA defaulted on the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, Taylor had a choice of 
remedies. He could have accelerated the debt and sued for the amount due or he could have 
repossessed the pledged stock and sold the stock in a commercially reasonable manner. (R., pp. 
2156-59.) Taylor chose instead to waive the default and restructure the transaction without an 
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opinion letter. (R., pp. 2162-64.) This choice of remedies waived his right to make a claim 
against a now defunct Opinion Letter. 16 
Taylor argues that the waiver argument seeks to give effect to the illegal Stock 
Redemption Agreement. Not so. Riley seeks to give effect to the Opinion Letter, something that 
Taylor argues is not an illegal agreement. (Respondent's Brief, p. 39.) The express language in 
the Opinion Letter clearly states that Riley assumed no responsibility for subsequent actions or 
events that effect the validity of any opinion. (R., p. 591.) 
This opinion is rendered only with respect to the laws and the 
rules, regulations and orders ( excluding the principles of conflicts 
of laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date 
hereof. We assume no responsibility for updating this opinion to 
take into account any event, action, interpretation or change of law 
occurring subsequent to the date hereof that may affect the validity 
of any of any of the opinion expressed herein. 
(R., p. 594.) A restructure of the entire agreement upon which the Opinion Letter opined could 
not possibly be a bigger event or action occurring subsequent to the date of the Opinion Letter 
that might effect the validity of the opinions therein. Riley's waiver argument seeks recognition 
that the Opinion Letter, of its own express terms, ceased to have effect when the Stock 
Redemption Agreement was restructured. 
Taylor argues that this Court has already ruled that both the Stock Redemption 
Agreement and the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement were illegal and unenforceable 
and that because this Court previously rejected Taylor's attempt to enforce the Stock 
Redemption Agreement through the release provisions either in the Stock Redemption 
16 The right was waived as to AIA Services and as to Riley as an agent. C.J.S. Release§ 63 
(Release of the principal releases the agent as well). 
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Restructure Agreement, Riley cannot use those release provisions as they would be illegal and 
unenforceable as well. (Respondent's Brief, p. 32.) Taylor reads this Court's previous 
discussion of the release provisions in the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement too broadly. 
First, this Court held that AIA could rely upon the illegality of the Stock Redemption Agreement 
"as a defense to Reed Taylor's claims." Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 570,261 P.3d at 847. 
Second, this Court held that an illegal contract is against public policy and any release 
promising not to assert illegality is also against public policy and is void as a document in 
furtherance of the illegal contract. Id This Court specifically analyzed the Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement containing "a release provision whereby Reed Taylor and the companies 
involved in the agreement agreed to release each other from all claim against each other arising 
out of previous agreements or business arrangements between them or arising out of Reed 
Taylor's ownership of or employment by AIA Services other than those obligations set forth in 
the Restructure Agreement." Id at 560,261 P.3d at 846. Upon reviewing this and other releases 
and indemnification agreements, this Court found that "none of them appear to have any bearing 
on the issue of illegality of the Stock Redemption Agreement." Id "The release and 
indemnification agreements all concern claims, fees, liabilities, fines, etc." Id. at 570, 261 P.3d 
at 847. 
It is this same release provision in the Restructure Agreement upon which Riley relies as 
a defense. Because this release does not promise to not assert illegality, it is not against public 
policy and is not void as a document in furtherance of the illegal contract. Consequently, this 
release is unaffected by the illegality of the Stock Redemption Agreement. Taylor has thereby 
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released any and all claims arising out of the Stock Redemption Agreement. Because release of 
the principal acts as a release of the agent, Taylor has released his present claim against Riley. 
D. TAYLOR PROXIMATELY CAUSED HIS OWN DAMAGES. 
Taylor argues that the 2006 Subordination Agreement between he and his ex-wife, which 
reversed the priority of payment upon which the Opinion Letter was based, is irrelevant because 
the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was already in violation of Idaho law. Taylor misses the 
point. 
When the Stock Redemption Agreement was entered into there was no violation of Idaho 
Code § 30-1-6 because AIA's promise to pay Taylor was already subordinated to its then 
existing obligation to first pay Donna Taylor. Before the Stock Redemption Agreement was 
entered into and before the Opinion Letter was issued, Reed Taylor was a party to an agreement 
to redeem Donna Taylor's preferred stock. That 1987 agreement subordinated AIA's obligation 
to redeem Taylor's common stock to its obligation to redeem Donna Taylor's preferred stock and 
the obligation to release her stock is expressly payable only out of legally available funds. (R., p. 
1927.) As long as Donna's stock was unredeemed and could be redeemed only from legally 
available funds, the subordinated obligation to redeem Taylor's stock was legal. This agreement 
predated the Stock Redemption Agreement and no one has claimed that it is illegal or 
unenforceable. This pre-Stock Redemption Agreement subordination was specifically addressed 
in the Stock Redemption Agreement and the $6 million note. Taylor agreed to receive no 
payment on the principal of the Note until Donna Taylor's shares were redeemed and agreed to 
receive no interest payments on the note if Donna Taylor's payments were in default. 
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No redemption of Donna Taylor's preferred stock, and therefore no redemption of 
Taylor's common stock, could occur until Donna Taylor's stock was redeemed out of legally 
available funds. That event never occurred. Before Taylor filed suit against AIA alleging 
default under the Stock Redemption Agreement, he induced his ex-wife to sign the 2006 
Subordination Agreement reversing the order of priority payment, the effect of which was to 
cause Taylor's debt to become due without being subject to the requirement that existed when 
the Opinion Letter was given in 1995. This seismic change orchestrated by Taylor and his 
attorney proximately caused the Stock Redemption Agreement to become illegal and 
unenforceable ten years after the Opinion Letter was written. 
E. RILEY OWES NO DUTY TO TAYLOR. 
Taylor asks this Court to extend the duty Riley owed exclusive to his client to himself as 
a third-party beneficiary. He seeks to do so under three theories: (1) extending the Harrigfeld 
exception to include third-party opinion letter recipients; (2) creating an assumed duty; and (3) 
extending the tort of negligent misrepresentation to attorneys. Taylor's first theory -extending 
the Harrigfeld exception - runs headlong into his prior, unsuccessful effort in Riley Lawsuit #1 
to extend that exception to include himself as a third-party beneficiary of Riley's representation 
of AIA on the Stock Redemption Agreement in 1995. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845, 
243 P.3d 642, 661 (2010) (Riley Lawsuit #1). 17 Taylor's second and third theories - creating an 
assumed duty and extending negligent misrepresentation to attorneys- are efforts to resurrect his 
prior cross appeal which was dismissed by this Court because the issues were beyond the scope 
17Taylor's prior effort to extend a duty to himself as a third party-beneficiary precludes him from 
raising this issue in this litigation. See the Res Judicata section irfra. 
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of review in this permissive appeal. (R., p. 2674-75.) Regardless, there is no merit to either of 
these theories. 
1. Riley Has Not Waived His Right to Appeal the District Court's Ruling on the 
Duty Owed. 
Taylor's preliminary argument that Riley has waived his right to appeal the duty issue 
because he did not specifically address the Harrigfeld factors, is without merit. Riley appealed 
from the district court's ruling in the Memorandum Opinion and Order on appeal that there was a 
new exception to the "general rule of no liability to a non-client as announced in Harrigfeld." 
(R., p. 2568.) The district court did not base its ruling on the Harrigfeld balance of harms test, 
nor did it address each factor of that test. (R., pp. 2567-2569.) The district court simply ruled 
there was a new exception. Id 
Taylor's argument that Riley waived his right to appeal the duty issue because he failed 
to deny that he assumed a duty to Taylor is simply frivolous. There was no denial because the 
issue of assumed duty was not briefed by the parties, considered by or ruled on by the district 
court in the Memorandum Opinion and Order on appeal. Whether there was an assumed duty is 
not properly before this Court in this permissive appeal. 
Taylor's request that this Court review the assumed duty theory and the application of 
negligent misrepresentation to attorneys under the "correct result but different, alternative 
theory" standard of review is equally frivolous. Neither issue was raised or decided in the 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on appeal. Both issues were dismissed in Taylor's ill-fated 
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cross appeal. 18 The request to affirm the district court on all correct or alternative theories is in 
direct contravention of the limited scope of review in this permissive appeal and should be 
rejected. 19 A "general" denial of Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment did not transform these 
non-reviewable issues into issues properly before this Court. 
2. Idaho Has Not Recognized a Duty Owed by an Attorney to Any Third-Party 
(Except an Intended Beneficiary of Testamentary Instruments) and Has 
Specifically Rejected Extending a Duty to Taylor. 
This Court has consistently rejected prior attempts to create a new or broader exception to 
the general rule that an attorney's duty is to his client and not to third parties. See Taylor v. 
Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005); Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 
(2010); and St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Thomas R. Luciani, Stamper, 
Rubens, Stocker & Smith, P.S., 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013). In Riley Lawsuit #1, this 
Court specifically rejected Taylor's claim that as a third-party beneficiary to the attorney/client 
relationship between Riley and AIA, he has standing to pursue a malpractice claim against 
Riley.20 McNichols, 149 Idaho at 845, 243 P.3d at 661. To paraphrase this Court's prior 
rejection - Taylor continues to cite to law from other jurisdictions, continues to ignore well 
18 Taylor's notice of cross-appeal identified the following issues: (1) extending the rule in Dzefjin 
to include attorneys; and (2) whether a duty was owed based on the assumed duty doctrine. (R., 
p. 2664.) This Court dismissed the cross-appeal and limited the issues to those raised and 
decided in the Memorandum Opinion and Order appealed from. (R., p. 2675.) 
19 Without waiver of his position that neither the assumed duty nor negligent misrepresentation 
issues are properly before the Court, Riley will address the merits (or lack thereof) of these 
arguments so as not to leave these issues unaddressed should this Court disagree with Riley's 
view of the narrow scope of review in this permissive appeal. 
20 This prior rejection of Taylor's claim for malpractice against Riley precludes him, under res 
judicata, from bringing his present claim. 
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established Idaho precedent that third-party beneficiaries to an attorney/client relationship do not 
have standing to pursue malpractice against an attorney and continues to offer no compelling 
reason why this Court should expand its carefully reasoned analysis in Harrigfeld. Id 
Taylor argues that this Court's prior rejection of his standing to sue Riley was in a 
different context; that the focus of Riley Lawsuit # 1 was on his role as a third-party adversary to 
Riley's client (AIA). Now, Taylor seeks to focus on his role as a third-party opinion letter 
recipient. 21 This Court, in Riley Lawsuit #1, examined Taylor's role as a third-party to an 
attorney/client relationship between Riley and AIA. Id This Court rejected Taylor's argument 
that Taylor can sue Riley because he was a third-party to the attorney/client relationship. Id 
This Court refused to extend Harrigfeld not just because Taylor was a third-party adversary but, 
more broadly, because Taylor was not a party to the attorney/client relationship.22 Id 
Nevertheless, Taylor argues that his role as an opinion letter recipient requires that he be 
extended a duty. Regardless of the label or the focus, Taylor was not a party to the attorney-
client relationship between Riley and AIA. Regardless of the bases for this latest attempt, this 
Court's prior ruling that Riley does not owe a duty to Taylor still stands both for res judicata 
purposes and as the law in Idaho - no duty is owed by an attorney to non-clients beyond that 
allowed in Harrigfeld. 
21 This is not a new role that sprung up after Riley Lawsuit# 1. Once again, res judicata 
precludes Taylor from alleging one theory based on one role in one action and, once it fails, 
alleging another theory based on a different role in a second action. 
22 Of note, this Court did not address Harrigfeld until it examined whether Taylor failed to state a 
claim for malpractice under Rule 12(b)(6). McNichols, 149 Idaho at 845,243 P.3d at 661. 
Harrigfeld was not addressed in the portion of this Court's opinion dealing with litigation 
privilege. 
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Taylor argues that he does not seek to extend Harrigfeld but simply to apply it to his 
circumstances. Applying Harrigfeld reveals the weaknesses in Taylor's position. In Harrigfeld, 
the document claimed to have been negligently prepared was a testamentary instrument that 
transferred rights or interests to those named in that instrument. Harrigfeld v. JD. Hancock, 140 
Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (2004). In the case at bar, the equivalent document is the 
Stock Redemption Agreement. The Stock Redemption Agreement, not the Opinion Letter, is the 
"testamentary" instrument in the present case that transferred rights or interests. Taylor's present 
claim for malpractice is not based on a negligently drafted Stock Redemption Agreement. 
In Harrigfeld, the "clearly foreseeable harm" to the intended beneficiary, in the event of a 
negligently drafted testamentary instrument, :was that the estate was not distributed in accordance 
with the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instrument. Id. 
Here, "clearly foreseeable harm" did not exist in the event of a negligently drafted 
· opinion letter because the opinion letter is not the document that effected the transfer of rights 
and interests. Here, unlike the testamentary instrument in Harrigfeld, a negligently drafted 
opinion letter does not have the same "high degree of certainty" that the third-party beneficiary 
(Taylor) will be harmed. Unlike in Harrigfeld, the connection between the attorney's conduct 
and the harm is not direct. The harm equivalent to that in Harrigfeld occurred upon default of 
the Stock Redemption Agreement when the interests and rights were not distributed to Taylor in 
accordance with the terms of that document. As the district court held here "[i]t should be noted 
that the default on the Note in 1996 does not constitute damage flowing from the opinion letter .. 
. [t]he erroneous opinion letter did not cause the default." (R., p. 1688.) Nor did the Opinion 
Letter cause the Stock Redemption Agreement to be illegal. Here, the harm was not clearly 
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foreseeable nor was there a high degree of certainty that Taylor would be directly harmed by a 
negligently drafted instrument as was the case in Harrigfeld. 23 Harrigfeld does not apply to 
Taylor's circumstances. 
Taylor again relies on a "long history of cases in other jurisdictions holding that non-
clients are owed duties through opinion letters" and indeed he string cites to many cases from 
foreign jurisdictions. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-11.) This second effort to rely on case law 
from other jurisdictions should suffer the same fate as the first - the law from other jurisdictions 
ignores well-established Idaho precedent and fails to present a compelling reason why this Court 
should expand its carefully reasoned analysis in Harrigfeld. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 845, 243 
P.3d at 661. 
3. Whether There Was an Assumed Duty Owed by Riley to Taylor Was Not 
Raised or Decided in the Memorandum Opinion and Order on Appeal; Riley 
Cannot Have Assumed a Duty Because He was Acting Within His Role as an 
Attorney for His Client. 
As discussed above, the issue of whether Riley assumed a duty to Taylor is not properly 
before this Court. Even if this Court were inclined to consider this issue, an assumed duty in the 
context of an attorney/client relationship applies only when the attorney is acting outside of his 
role as an attorney for his client. In Allen v. Stoker, 138 Idaho 265, 61 P.3d 622 (Ct.App. 2002), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that liability only arises from an assumed duty, despite the lack 
of an attorney/client relationship, when the negligent act was not in the attorney's performance 
of legal services for his client but was instead an act done for a third-party separate and apart 
23 The allegedly negligently drafted Opinion Letter is even further removed from the Harrigfeld 
circumstances. This is best exemplified by the facts that the original Stock Redemption 
Agreement for which the Opinion Letter was issued was superseded by the 1996 Restructure 
Agreement for which there was no Opinion Letter and that in 2006 Taylor caused the priority of 
payment to be reversed in the Subordination ,A~greement. 
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from the attorney's representation of his client. Id., 138 Idaho at 268, 61 P.3d at 625. Here, the 
Opinion Letter was prepared at the direction of and on behalf of Riley's client (AIA). (R., pp. 
591; 2960.) The Opinion Letter was prepared in the performance of legal services for Riley's 
client. Preparation of the Opinion Letter was not done separate and apart from his representation 
of that client. Riley did not assume a duty to Taylor. 
4. Whether to Extend Negligent Misrepresentation to Attorneys Was Not 
Raised or Decided in the Memorandum Decision and Order at Issue; Idaho 
Does Not Recognize a Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation 
Beyond Accountants. 
The issue of whether to extend negligent misrepresentation to include attorneys is not 
properly before this Court on permissive appeal. Regardless, Idaho has a longer history of 
refusing to extend negligent misrepresentation beyond accountants than it does refusing to 
extend an attorney's duty beyond his client. This Court has strictly limited the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation to professional relationships involving accountants. Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Assoc., 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995). This Court has 
specifically refused to extend the tort of negligent misrepresentation to businessmen (Mannas v. 
Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007); insurance agents (Vincent v. Safeco Ins. 
Co. of America, 136 Idaho 107, 111, 29 P.3d 943, 947 (2001); or real estate brokers (Graefe v. 
Vaughn, 132 Idaho 349, 351, 972 P.2d 317, 319 (Ct.App. 1999). It should continue to limit 
negligent misrepresentation and resist extending Harrigfeld or for extending negligent 
misrepresentation to attorneys. 
In any event, negligent misrepresentation should not be applied to malpractice claims by 
opinion letter recipients against the opinion givers. An opinion is an expression of professional 
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judgment, not a representation or warranty. An incorrect opinion is not actionable unless 
negligently prepared. 
5. If a Duty is Owed By an Attorney to a Third-Party Opinion Letter Recipient, 
it Must be Limited to Preparing a Non-Negligent Opinion Letter. 
Unlike the assumed duty issue and the negligent misrepresentation issue, the issue of the 
scope of the duty, if one is created by the Court, is not a new issue beyond the scope ofreview in 
a permissive appeal. It is a related, collateral issue that must necessarily be addressed as part of 
the process or creating or extending the duty. If this Court is to adopt a new duty or extend a 
duty beyond Harrigfeld, it follows that the litigants must know the scope of that duty. 
The scope of any duty owed by an attorney to an opinion letter recipient, if one is adopted 
by this Court, should be limited to preparing a non-negligent opinion letter. See Legal Opinions 
in Business Transactions, 2d Ed., § 3: 11, pp. 3-21. This is consistent with the case law relied on 
by the district court and the cases from other jurisdictions relied on by Taylor. (R., p. 1684; 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-11.) These cases do not extend the duty beyond the obligation to use 
reasonable care in preparing the Opinion Letter. These cases do not extend the duty to include 
ensuring adoption of proper shareholder resolutions, compliance with all applicable statutes, 
enforceability of the Stock Redemption Agreement and related documents or that the opinion 
letter recipient receive the benefit of the bargain.24 
24 That Taylor argues that he is entitled to seek from Riley the benefits of the bargain of the 
Stock Redemption Agreement and promissory note confirms that the damages he is seeking here 
are those he would have received had the Stock Redemption Agreement not been deemed illegal 
and unenforceable, something he is barred from receiving. 
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Harrigfeld is instructive on the scope of the duty found in that case. This Court held 
there that "[ o ]ur extension of the attorney's duty is very limited" and defined the scope of that 
duty as follows: 
. The attorney has no duty to insure that persons who would 
normally be the objects of the testator's affection are included as 
beneficiaries in the testamentary instruments. . . . The attorney 
likewise has no duty to see that the testator distributes his or her 
property among the named beneficiaries in any particular manner. 
. . . An attorney preparing a document that revokes or amends a 
client's existing testamentary instrument(s) has no duty to the 
beneficiaries named or identified in such instruments to notify 
them, consult with them, or in any way dissuade the testator from 
eliminating or reducing their share of his or her estate. . . . This 
extension of an attorney's duty will not subject attorneys to 
lawsuits by persons who simply did not receive what they believed 
was their fair share of the testator's estate, or who simply did not 
receive in the testamentary instruments what they understood the 
testator had stated or indicated they would receive. 
Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 138, 139, 90 P.3d at 888, 889. As in Harrigfeld, if a duty is extended to 
Taylor, it should not extend beyond the obligation to exercise reasonable care in preparing the 
. . 1 25 opm10n etter. 
6. Any Cause of Action Adopted by this Court Should Include, as an Element, 
Reasonable and Justifiable Reliance. 
Like the scope of the duty, delineating the other elements of the new cause of action is 
not a new issue on appeal but rather a collateral issue that follows from adoption or extension of 
25 Riley's status as general counsel for AIA should not expand the scope of the duty beyond non-
negligent preparation of the opinion letter. To do so would run afoul of Harrigfeld's caution that 
the attorney's duty to his or her client must remain paramount. Id. Taylor is asking the Court to 
expand the scope of any duty that may be adopted because Riley had a client (i.e., general 
counsel for AIA). This runs counter to the strong public policy considerations not to create a 
conflict between an attorney and his client and not to chill the duty to zealously represent one's 
client. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 838,243 P.2d at 654. 
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Harrigfeld.26 Taylor argues that this Court, should it adopt a new duty, should not include 
justifiable or reasonable reliance as an element. Interestingly, nearly every case relied upon by 
Taylor in support of his argument that the Court should extend the Harrigfeld exception to 
include third-party opinion letter recipients require reliance as an element.27 In fact, Taylor cites 
to one of those cases and quotes the reliance language. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 13-14.) 
("Finally, by addressing and sending the opinion letter direct to [Taylor, Riley, Turnbow and 
Eberle] clearly engaged in conduct which evinced [their] awareness and understanding that 
[Taylor] would rely on that letter, and provided the requisite link between the parties. 
Prudential, 605 N.E.2d at 322 (R. 24-28: App A.") (Brackets in original) (underscoring added). 
Equally interesting is Taylor's improper request that this Court extend negligent 
misrepresentation to attorneys and his disingenuous position that reliance not be an element of 
the cause of action if adopted. Idaho has ruled that the tort of negligent misrepresentation as it 
applies to accountants has as an essential element that reliance be justified. Irwin Rogers Ins. v. 
Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 274, 833 P.2d 128, 132 (Ct.App. 1992)("An essential element of the 
26 Regardless, the district court did, in effect, rule on the elements of the cause of action Taylor 
seeks to bring against Riley. The district court noted that the "negligence claim" is referred to 
loosely by the parties as a "malpractice claim" but that such a claim requires an attorney/client 
relationship "in addition to the elements of an ordinary negligence claim." (R., p. 2560, n. 3.) 
The district court then noted that it held "the attorneys have a duty to plaintiff notwithstanding 
the lack of attorney/client relationship." Clearly, the district court's decision places in issue the 
question whether an expanded duty is predicated on ordinary negligence or whether dropping the 
privity requirement from the old cause of action for malpractice should be replaced with the 
element of justifiable reliance. 
27 Whether Taylor did in fact reasonably or justifiably rely on the Opinion Letter is an issue 
beyond the scope ofreview in this permissive appeal. That portion of Taylor's brief attempting 
to show he did rely on the Opinion Letter can be ignored or stricken. See Respondent's Brief, 
pp. 17-18. Regardless, this Court already determined that Taylor was not justifiably ignorant of 
the facts underlying the illegality defense. Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 565-66, 261 P.3d at 842-
43. 
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torts of both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, whether actual or constructive, is that 
the recipient's reliance on the representation be justified."); Stewart Title v. Nampa Title, 110 
Idaho 330,333, 715 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1986)("Sincejustifiable reliance is an essential element of 
negligent misrepresentation and since the trial court concluded that Anderson's reliance was not 
justified, recovery for negligent misrepresentation was precluded.") Taylor should not be 
allowed to have it both ways. If this Court is inclined to extend an attorney's duty to opinion 
letter recipients, it should also make reasonable and justifiable reliance an element of the 
resulting cause of action. 
F. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
If this Court determines that Taylor's malpractice claim against Riley is not barred by the 
illegality doctrine, it must necessarily conclude that the illegal Stock Redemption Agreement is 
not the commercial transaction at issue. Because the only relationship between Taylor and Riley 
is commercial in nature and since Taylor brought his present claim in the guise of a legal 
malpractice action, Riley is entitled to a ruling by this Court that if he is the prevailing party, 
attorney fees incurred on appeal can be awarded. Reynolds v. Trout, Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, 
P.A., 154 Idaho 21,293 P.3d 645, 651 (2013). 
DATED this _2J_ day of November, 2013. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: _{){_87_. 4.~~L~· _-_ 
J~ffi/ey A. Thomson, Of the firm 1meys for Appellant Richard A. Riley 
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